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ESTABLISHING FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW JUDGES AS AN INDEPENDENT
CORPS: THE HEFLIN BILL
VICTOR
EDWIN

I.

S.

W.

PALMER

BERNSTEIN-

INTRODUCTION

At the annual banquet of the Federal Administrative Law
Judges Conference on May 14, 1983, Senator Howell Heftin an
nounced that two days earlier he had introduced a bill to establish
administrative law judges as an independent, unified corps. The
Senator discussed the importance of the administrative judiciary and
the need for its functions to be performed in an independent atmos
phere, free of bias, in order to assure fairness and give credence to its
decisions. Senator Heftin stressed that "these judicial officers must
be free from any association or personal obligation to any party or
agency in order that every litigant to the process be afforded fairness
and due process. The mere appearance of bias and prejudice smacks
at the vital concept of fairness and due process."·
• Administrative Law Judge, U. S. Depanment of Agriculture, from 1975 to pres
ent. B.A., and J.D., Columbia University. Member of Maryland, District of Columbia,
and the United States Supreme Court Bars. Prior to joining the Depanment of Agricul
ture, engaged in private practice specializing in litigation and administrative law. Chair
man of The Federal Administrative Law Judges Conference's "Committee on the
Corps," and an officer of the American Bar Association's National Conference of Ad
ministrative Law Judges, Judicial Administration Division. Testified regarding Senate
Bill 1275 before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Administra
tive Practice and Procedure, on June 23, 1983.
•• B.A., University of Pennsylvania; LL.B., Columbia University School of Law.
Member of the New York, Maryland, District of Columbia, and United States Supreme
Court Bars. Member of the United States Army, Europe Board of Contract Appeals
from 1968-1972. Administrative Law Judge, United States Department of Labor from
1973-1979, Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission from 1979 to 1981, and
United States Postal Service from 1981 to present. President of The Federal Administra
tive Law Judges Conference since June 1983. Liaison Representative to the Administra
tive Conference of the United States since June 1983. Testified regarding Senate Bill
1275 before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Administrative
Practice and Procedure, on June 23, 1983.
1. Address of Senator Heflin, Federal Administrative Law Judges Conference An·
nual Banquet in Washington, D.C. (May 14, 1983). See also 129 CONO. REc. S6610-11
(daily ed. May 12, 1983) (statement of Sen. Heflin). "Agency" as used by Senator Heflin
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Senator Heflin noted that the use of similar systems in several
States had resulted in substantial savings and efficiencies that he ex
pected the federal government would experience once his bill, Senate
bill 12752 was enacted. 3
This article will describe the status of administrative law judges
in the federal government; analyze Senate bill 1275; review the testi
mony before the Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Pro
cedure, Senate Judiciary Committee; and evaluate the arguments in
support of and in opposition to Senator Hefiin's bill.
II.

THE PRESENT STATUS OF FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
JUDGES

There are 1,134 administrative law judges serving in the federal
government today.4 They hear and decide cases that "permeate
every sphere and almost every activity of our national life [and] have
a profound effect upon the direction of our economic growth."s
Professor Kenneth Culp Davis estimates that the use of admin
istrative judges began in 1789 with the appointment of officers to
determine which soldiers were "disabled during the late war" and
customs officers who were authorized to "estimate the duties paya
ble" on imports.6
But 1946 is the true year of birth for today's federal administra
tive law judge. That is the year the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA) was enacted. 7
Under the APA, administrative law judges presently hold career
appointments pursuant to a system of merit selection. 8 They are the
only government officers, apart from certain agency heads or officials
who are provided for specially under other specific statutes, who
may conduct rulemaking and adjudicative hearings when agency ac
and by the authors, includes executive departments. This is consistent with the definition
of "agency" in the Administrative Procedure Act. 5 U.S.C. § 551(1) (1982).
2. S. 1275, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983).
3. 129 CONGo REC. S6610 (daily ed. May 12, 1983) (statement of Sen. Heflin).
4. OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT, TOTAL NUMBER OF AUs ON BOARD BY
GRADE AND AGENCY AS OF NOVEMBER 21, 1983.
5. Message of President John F. Kennedy, H.R. Doc. No. 135, 57th Cong., 1st
Sess. 1-2 (1961), quoted in Macy, The APA 0IId the HelUing Examiner: Products of a
Viable Political Society, 27 FED. B.J. 351, 353 (1967).
6. 3 K.C. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 17.11, at 313 (2d ed. 1978).
7. Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, ch. 324, 60 Stat. 237 (current version at 5
U.S.c. §§ 551-559,701-706,1305,3105,3344,6362,7562 (1982».
8. ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE U. S., FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
JUDGE HEARINGS STATUS REPORT FOR 1976-1978, at 9-13 (1980).
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tion is based on substantial evidence of record. Their functions have
been held to be "functionally comparable"9 to those of trial judges
which entitles them to absolute immunity from liability arising out
of their judicial acts. IO
The APA was enacted in response to charges that "the practice
of creating independent regulatory commissions, who perform ad
ministrative work in addition to judicial work, threatens to develop a
'fourth branch' of the Government for which there is no sanction in
the Constitution." II
The change in the status of administrative law judges l2 effectu
ated by the APA, was first reviewed by the Supreme Court in Ram
speck v. Federal Trial Examiners Conference .13 In that case the
Supreme Court traced the history of these Article I officers and the
9. Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 513 (1978).
10. Id. at 516.
II. S. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. (1937), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HIs
TORY OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT OF 1946, at 189 (1946).
12. In 1978, the APA was amended to substitute the title "Administrative Law
Judge" for the earlier designation "Hearing Examiner." Act of March 27, 1978, Pub. L.
No. 95-251, §§ 2. 3. 92 Stat. 183. 183-84.
13. 345 U.S. 128 (1953).
Prior to the passage of the Administrative Procedure Act, hearing examiners'
tenure and status were governed by the Classification Act of 1923, as amended.
Under the Classification Act, as employees of an agency. their classification was
determined by the ratings given them by the agency, and their compensation
and promotion depended upon their classification. The examiners were in a
dependent status.
With the rapid growth of administrative law [their) role ...became in
creasingly significant and controversial. . . .
Many complaints were voiced against the actions of the hearing examiners.
it being charged that they were mere tools of the agency concerned and sub
servient to the agency heads in making their proposed findings of fact and rec
ommendations. A study by President Roosevelt·s Committee on
Administrative Management resulted in a report in 1937 recommending separa
tion of adjudicatory functions and personnel from investigative and prosecution
personnel in the agencies. The Attorney General's Committee on Administra
tive Procedure was appointed in 1939 to study the decisional process in admin
istrative agencies. and the final report of this Committee was published in 1941.
Both the majority and minority members of the Committee recommended that
hearing examiners be made partially independent of the agency by which they
were employed; the majority recommended hearing examiners be appointed for
a term of seven years and the minority recommended a term of twelve years.
Although extensive hearings were held on bills to carry out the recommenda
tions of this Committee. World War II delayed final congressional action on
this subject. After the war, the McCarron-Sumners Bill, which became the Ad
ministrative Procedure Act, was introduced. The Senate Judiciary Print of June
1945 reveals that at that time there was still great diversity of opinion as to how
the status of hearing examiners should be enhanced. Several proposals were
considered, and in the final bill Congress provided that hearing examiners
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controversial nature of their positions. The APA's legislative history
demonstrates that there had been much stronger support for the cre
ation of a fully, independent administrative judiciary than that indi
cated by the majority opinion in Ramspeck .14 The final report of the
Attorney General's Committee, for example, contains an express rec
ommendation by the minority members for complete separation of
the adjudicative function in cases involving agency prosecution of
complaints against private parties:
Hearing and deciding officers cannot be wholly independent so
long as their appointments, assignments, personnel records, and
reputations are subject to control by an authority which is also
engaged in investigating and prosecuting. Of course, this depen
dence may be diminished by various devices, as the Committee
has very rightly attempted. We think it clear, however, that such
dependents (sic) cannot be eliminated by measures short of com- .
plete segregation into independent agencies. I S
Concern over administrative impartiality antedating the 1946
enactment of the APA had led to earlier congressional responses. In
1939, Senator Norris introduced a bill to create a separate adminis
trative court. 16 A succession of bills offering various remedies were
introduced in Congress between 1933 and 1946;17 and, during the
interim between the appointment of the Attorney General's Com
mittee pursuant to the directions of President· Roosevelt, and the is
suance of its formal report, Congress actually passed one of them
the Walter-Logan bill. IS It was vetoed by President Roosevelt on
December 18, 1940, and the veto was sustained by the House. When
this event was later discussed by Justice Jackson in Wong Yang Sung
v. McGralh,19 however, he concluded that though the President ve
toed the bill, he recognized the need for reform. 20 Justice Jackson
should be given independence and tenure within the existing Civil Service
system.
Id. at 130-32.
14. S. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. (1937), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HIS
TORY OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT OF 1946, at 41-42 (1946).
15. ATT'y GENERAL'S COMM. ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE, ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURE IN GOv'T AGENCIES, S. Doc. No.8, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 203-09 (1941).
16. S. 5154, 70th Cong., 2d Sess. (1939).
17. S. 1835, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. (1933); S. 3787, H.R. 1297, 74th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1936); S. 3676, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. (1938); H.R. 6324, H.R. 4235, H.R. 4236, S. 915, S.
916, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. (1939); S. 674, S. 675, S. 918, H.R. 3464, H.R. 4238, H.R. 4782,
77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1941); H.R. 1203, S. 7, 79th Cong., lst Sess. (1945).
18. S. 915, H.R. 6324, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. (1939).
19. 339 U.S. 33 (1950).
20. Id. at 39.
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said of the APA itself: "The Act thus represents a long period of
study and strife; it settles long-continued and hard-fought conten
tions, and enacts a formula upon which opposing social and political
forces have come to rest. It contains many compromises and gener
alities and, no doubt, some ambiguities. Experience may reveal
defects. . . ."21
The alternatives before Congress and the methodology selected
to secure the independence of the administrative judiciary is de
scribed in the legislative history of the APA, as follows:
The purpose of this section is to render examiners independent
and secure in their tenure and compensation. The section (section
Uof the APA) thus takes a different ground than the present situa
tion in which examiners are mere employees of an agency, and
other proposals for a completely separate "examiners' pool" from
which agencies might draw for hearing officers. Recognizing that
the entire tradition of the Civil Service is directed toward security
of tenure, it seems wise to put that tradition to use in the present
case. However, additional powers are conferred upon the
Commission. 22

When the Supreme Court, in Butz v. Economou 23 held adminis
trative law judges to be "functionally comparable" to trial judges, it
stressed that they resolve conflicts of an adversarial nature "every bit
as fractious as those which come to court," and have comparable
powers to issue subpoenas, rule on proffers of evidence, regulate the
course of hearings, and make or recommend decisions. 24 The opin
ion went on to list the APA's provisions designed to guarantee the
independence of administrative law judges: The Office of Personnel
Management and the appointing agency-employer controls their
pay; cases must be assigned to them in rotation so far as practicable;
no party may consult with them exparte concerning a fact at issue in
21. Id. at 40-41.
Of the several administrative evils sought to be cured or minimized, only two
are particularly relevant to issues before us today. One purpose was to intro
duce greater uniformity of procedure and standardization of administrative
practice among the diverse agencies whose customs had departed widely from
each other. . . .
More fundamental, however, was the purpose to curtail and change the
practice of embodying in one person or agency the duties of prosecutor and
judge.

Id.
22. S. Doc. No. 248, 79th Congo 2d Sess. (1937), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE
1946, at 215 (1946).
23. 438 U.S. 478 (1978).
24. Id. at 512-13.

TORY OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT OF
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a hearing; they may not be responsible to, supervised by, or directed
by agency agents or personnel performing investigative or prosecu
tion functions; they may not perform duties inconsistent with their
duties as administrative law judges; and they may be removed only
for good cause established and determined by the Merit System Pro
tection Board after a hearing on the record. 25
But the insulation from agency pressures that the APA affords
administrative law judges is far from complete. The Supreme Court
in its earlier decision in Ramspeck, upheld the right of the Civil
Service Commission26 to classify " the examiners into grades, with
salaries appropriate to each grade, . . . in each federal agency using
examiners. This classification ranged from just one grade in several
agencies to five grades in two agencies."27 The majority conceded
that the Commission had employed wholly subjective specifications
when it classified the grades as "moderately difficult and important,"
"difficult and important," ''unusually difficult and important," "ex
ceedingly difficult and important," and "exceptionally difficult and
important."28 Nevertheless, the majority upheld this practice under
which the employing "agency shall decide if there is a vacancy to be
filled, and further that the agency shall decide if this vacancy is to be
filled by promotion from among the present examiners."29
The majority opinion next interpreted the APA's requirement
that "examiners shall be assigned to cases in rotation sofar aspracti
cable ."30 The majority believed that this did not require mechanical
rotation, but permitted assignments to be made on the basis of "the
experience and ability of the examiner available."31
Finally, the majority held that an agency may dispense with the
services of administrative law judges "for lack of funds, personnel
ceilings, reorganizations, decrease of work and similar reasons"
through "reductions-in-force," under which judges holding the low
est number of "retention credits" may be removed from office "for
good cause" within the meaning of the APA. 32
Justice Black, with whom Justices Frankfurter and Douglas
25. Id.; see also 5 U.S.C. §§ 554(d). 3105.7521 (1982).
26. The Civil Service Commission was the predecessor of the Office of Personnel
Management and the Merit Systems Protection board.
27. Ramspeck. 345 U.S. at 135.
28. Id. at 136-37.
29. Id. at 138.
30. Id. at 139 (emphasis in original).
31. Id. at 139-40.
32. Id. at 142-43.
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concurred, vigorously disagreed with the Ramspeck majority
opinion:
I agree with the District Court and the Court of Appeals that the
regulations here sustained go a long way toward frustrating the
purposes of Congress to give examiners independence. . . . The
distinctions depended upon to support the different classifications
are so nebulous that the head of an agency is left practically free
to select any examiner he chooses for any case he chooses. . . .
And administrative agencies are permitted to attribute choice of a
particular examiner for a particular case to considerations whether
"complex legal, economic, financial or technical questions or mat
ters" are merely "moderately complex," "fairly complex," "ex
tremely complex," "exceptionally complex," or just "complex." I
think all these conceptualistic distinctions mean is that the con
gressional command for a nonagency controlled rotation of cases
is buried under words. 33

But, the Ramspeck majority is still the controlling interpretation
of the actual parameters of protection from agency pressures that the
APA provides to administrative law judges. Those who argue that
the APA's protections are so all-embracing that there is no need to
completely separate administrative law judges from their present
agency employers, necessarily ignore Ramspeck. They ignore con
cerns embodied in calls for the establishment of an administrative
court by the recommendations of the Second Hoover Commission in
1955,34 the Ash Council in 1971,3s and then Solicitor General Robert
H. Bork in 1977.36 They also overlook the 1974 report of the La
Macchia Committee which stopped short of recommending anew the
formation of an administrative court and opted instead for the estab
lishment of a "unified COrpS."37
33. Id. at 144-45 (Black, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted).
34. Comm'n on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government, 84th
Cong., 1st Sess., Report to the Congress Vol. VI, at 84 (1955). The recommended court
would have consisted.ofthree sections: Tax (which would involve transferring this func
tion from the Executive to the Judicial Branch); Labor (replacing the NLRB); and Trade
(replacing the FTC and certain other regulatory agencies). Hearing Examiners would
have been replaced by Hearing Commissioners serving as the Court's trial division. Id.
35. PRESIDENT'S ADVISORY COUNCIL ON EXECUTIVE ORGANIZATION, A NEW
REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 53 (1971). This proposed an administrative court having
jurisdiction over appeals from transportation, securities, and power agencies. Id.
36. DEP'T OF JUSTICE COMM. ON REVISION OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM,
THE NEEDS OF THE FEDERAL COURTS (1977). The Bork Committee proposed that non
Article III tribunals be created which "could consist of an Article I trial division. . .and
an administrative court of appeals. The trial division could serve the function now
served by administrative law judges. . . ." Id. at 7-11.
37. UNITED STATES CIVIL SERVICE COMM'N, REPORT OF THE COMM. ON THE
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It is this latter recommendation which the Heflin Bill would
implement.

III.

THE HEFLIN BILL: ITS PURPOSE AND PROVISIONS

The essential purpose of the Heflin bill is to remove administra
tive law judges from the supervision and control of the agencies
where they are presently employed, and establish them instead, as an
independent, unified COrpS.38
The Corps would initially be divided into seven divisions in
keeping with present, major specialties of administrative law. 39
Each division would be headed by a division chief judge required by
the bill to be an expert in the division's field of adjudication, demon
strated by having at least five years of experience as an administra
tive law judge assigned to cases of the type to be handled by the
division. 40 The division chiefs, together with the chief judge of the
STUDY OF THE UTILIZATION OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES (LAMACCHIA COMM'N
REpORT) 46 (1974).
38. 129 CONGo REC. S6609-l0 (daily ed. May 12, 1983) (statement of Sen. Heflin).
39. S. 1275, 98th Congo 1st Sess. § 2 (1983) (proposing codification at 5 U.S.C.
§ 564(b». These divisions would be organized in the following manner:
1. Division of Communication, Puhlic Utility and Transportation Regulation
Federal Communications Commission, Federal Energy Regulatory Commis
sion, Interstate Commerce Commission, Civil Aeronautics Board, Federal Mar
itime Commission, Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
2. Division of Healtlr, Safety and Environmental Regulation
Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission, Federal Mine Safety and
Health Review Commission, National Transportation Safety Board, Environ
mental Protection Agency, Department of the Interior, National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration, Coast Guard.
3. Division of Lahor Relations
National Labor Relations Board, Federal Labor Relations Authority.
4. Division of Benefits Program
Social Security Administration.
5. Division of Securities, Commodities and Trade Regulation
Department of Agriculture, Commodity Futures Trading Commission, Securi
ties and Exchange Commission, Federal Trade Commission, International
Trade Commission.
6. Division of Lahor
Department of Labor.
7. Division of General Programs
Drug Enforcement Administration, Department of Housing and Urban Devel
opment, Food and Drug Administration, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Fire
arms, Maritime Commission, U.S. Postal Service, Merit Systems Protection
Board.
40. Id. (proposing codification at 5 U.S.C. § 564(c».
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Corps, would govern the Corps' affairs and operations as a collegial
council.41
Administrative law judges are presently examined by the Office
of Personnel Management (OPM) which certifies the top three can
didates to individual agencies for appointment to available positions
as employees of those agencies. 42 The bill would preserve the pres
ent system of merit selection through OPM-administered examina
tion of candidates. 43 It would serve to enlarge the list of eligibles
from the best three to the best five candidates for each vacancy. This
would increase opportunities for women and ethnic minority candi
dates who are less likely to be entitled to veteran's preference. 44 Ex
isting administrative law judges would be transferred to the Corps
upon the commencement of its operation and each would be as
signed to a division after consideration of the areas of specialization
in which the judge had served.4S The judges would be paid uniform
salaries,46 though slightly higher salaries would be provided for the
chief judge and the division chiefs.
Additionally, the bill would screen applicants for the chief
judge of the Corps and the division chief judge positions by creating
a five-person Judicial Nomination Commission. 47 The Commission
would determine, for each vacancy, the three best qualified appli
cants, who had been administrative law judges for at least five years,
and forward those names to the President for his appointment by
41. Id. (proposing codification at 5 U.S.C. § 565(a».
42. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 3301, 3304, 3305 (1982).
43. See S. 1275, 98th Cong., 1st Scss. § 2 (1983) (proposing codification at 5 U.S.c.
§ 567(a».
44. OPM grades all candidates for administrative law judge positions in accord
ance with scores obtained in a fuU day written examination, an oral interview by a three
person panel, and vouchers furnished by lawyers and judges familiar with their abilities
and qualifying experience. Candidates who served in the armed forces have five points
added to their scores and disabled veterans and other preference eligibles, married or
related to disabled veterans, have ten points added under civil service laws. See 5 U.S.c.
§§ 2108, 3309 (1982).
45. S. 1275, 98th Cong., 1st Scss. § 2 (1983) (proposing codification at 5 U.S.c.
§§ 562(b), 564(a».
46. Id. (proposing codification at 5 U.S.c. § 567). The pay provisions in the bill are
couched in technical terms, but when translated provide a salary in the amount many
senior administrative law judges now receive.
47. Id.. (proposing codification at 5 U.S.C. § 566(a». This commission would be
appointed by the Chief Judge of the United States Coun of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit, the Chief Judge for the United States District Coun for the District of
Columbia Circuit, the Chairman of the Administrative Conference of the United States,
the Chairman of the Administrative Law Section of the American Bar Association, and
the President of the Federal Administrative Law Judges Conference. Id. (proposing cod
ification at 5 U.S.C. § 566(b».
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and with the advice and consent of the Senate. The bill also recog
nizes the Presidential power to reject any list of names designated for
anyone position, and to request the Commission to submit
another. 48
Once its members are appointed,49 the Council would have
powers similar to those possessed by individual agencies over admin
istrative law judges. 50 The bill, however, provides added responsi
bilities and duties to the Council. 5I Responsibility is also conferred
upon the Council to make appropriate arrangements for continuing
judicial education and training. 52
Inasmuch as the legal specialties that concern agencies may
change in the future, as will the number of judges needed to hear
their cases, the Council is authorized to change the number and ju
risdiction of the divisions. 53 In order to preclude the Council from
completely converting the judges into "generalists," it may not re
duce the number of divisions to less than four. On the other hand, to
prevent a regressive movement toward employment of judges as
"super-specialists," the Council may not increase the number of divi
sions to more than ten. 54
The agencies would continue to have review power over deci
sions of the judges.
For two years from the date the Corps begins its operations,
proceedings would continue to be conducted under the rules of prac
48. Id. (proposing codification at 5 U.S.C. § 566(e)(5». Professor Abraham Dash
noted this to be a novel methodology for screening judicial applicants, but since the bill
acknowledges the President's right to reject, it should, in his opinion, withstand chal
lenges that it unduly limits executive appointment powers contrary to the Constitution.
See infra note 66.
49. The bill provides for a five year term for the Chief Judge of the Corps but is
silent as to the terms of the division chiefs. S. 1275, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. § 2 (1983)
(proposing codification at 5 U.S.c. § 563(a». However, the Federal Administrative Law
Judges Conference proposed that they also serve five year terms that should be staggered
to avoid undue interruption ofthe workings of the Council. Judge V. Palmer, Chairman
of the Committee on the Corps of the Federal Administrative Law Judges Conference.
Prepared Statement Presented at the Senate Hearings on S. 1275 Before the Subcomm.
on Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th
Cong., lst Sess. 29 (June 23, 1983).
50. Compare S. 1275, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1983) wilh Romspeclc, 345 U. S. at
133-43.
51. S. 1275, 98th Cong., lst Sess. § 2 (1983) (proposing codification at 5 U.S.c.
§ 565).
52. Id. (proposing codification at 5 U.S.c. § 565(d)(6».
53. Id. (proposing codification at 5 U.S.c. § 564(b».
54. Id. (proposing codification at 5 U.S.C. § 564(a».
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tice promulgated by each agency.55 After two years, the Council is
authorized to prescribe uniform procedural rules. At that time, it
also would report its findings and make recommendations for appro
priate legislative reforms that would make review of the judges' deci
sions more efficient and accord greater finality to their decisions. 56 A
separate study and report is required for each division. 57 This
should cause the Council to take a hard look at the true nature of the
various forms of administrative decisionmaking. It would require
the Council to make distinctions between administrative adjudica
tions where fairness and public satisfaction outweigh the need to ac
comodate agency efficiency.58
The Corps would have jurisdiction over all matters presently
required by the APA to be conducted by an administrative law judge
in lieu of hearings conducted by the agency or its members. 59 The
proposed legislation also confers jurisdiction upon the Corps to hear
any other case referred by federal agencies and courts for determina
tion on a hearing record. 60
The legislation provides for the removal, suspension, repri
mand, or disciplining of judges on the basis of incompetence neglect
of duties, or misconduct. 61 Judges may also be removed or sus
pended for physical or mental disability.62 Under present law, an
administrative law judge may be removed, suspended, reduced in
grade or pay, or furloughed for up to 30 days upon a showing of
good cause by the employing agency in a hearing before the Merit
Systems Protection Board. 63 The language in the bill uses the more
explicit language employed by Congress to subject bankruptcy
judges to removal proceedings. 64 To assure that complaints against
55. Id. (proposing codification at 5 U.S.c. § 565(d)(7».
56. Id. § 3.
57. Id.
58. In his illuminating work on this subject, Professor Paul R. Verkuil, Dean of
Tulane University School of Law, recognizes adjudications involving the imposition of
sanctions as clearly being of this nature. See Verkuil, The Emerging Concept of Adminis
trative Procedure, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 258, 295 (1978).
59. S. 1275, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1983) (proposing codification at 5 U.S.C.
§ 568(a».
60. Id. (proposing codification at 5 U.S.C. § 568(d».
61. Id. (proposing codification at 5 U.S.C. § 569(a)(I».
62. Id.
63. 5 U.S.c. § 7521 (1982).
64. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 153(b) (West Supp. 1983). These provisions were enacted as
appropriate to judges appointed pursuant to Article I of the Constitution who, unlike
judges appointed pursuant to Article 3, do not have life tenure. See also Northern Pipe
line Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
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the judges are investigated fairly and expeditiously, the bill provides
for their processing by panels of administrative law judges for a sys
tem of peer review. 6s
IV.

THE SENATE HEARINGS ON SENATE BILL 1275

The Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Ad
ministrative Practice and Procedure, has convened two hearings on
Senate bill 1275.66
The Subcommittee heard first from a panel of administrative
law judges, introduced by Judge Edwin S. Bernstein, President of the
Federal Administrative Law Judges Conference. 67 Judge Bernstein
emphasized that Senate bill 1275 was supported by each of the three
organizations which represent administrative law judges: the Fed
eral Administrative Law Judges Conference,68 the National Confer
ence of Administrative Law Judges,69 and the Association of
Administrative Law Judges, Inc. 70
Judge Victor W. Palmer testified at length as Chairman of the
Federal Administrative Law Judges Conference's Unified Corps
Committee. He urged the enactment of Senate bill 1275 to redress
urgent, critical problems adversely affecting Americans. Specifically,
he called attention to those seeking Social Security benefits, facing
the loss of licenses to engage in federally regulated businesses, those
65. S. 1275, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1983) (proposing codification at 5 U.S.C.
§ 569(c)-(g». The bill's peer review system is akin to that now applicable to federal dis
trict court and circuit court judges, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A. § 372(c) (West Supp. 1983).
This system's prototype has recently been implemented by the United States Department
of Labor to handle complaints involving its administrative law judges.
66. The Subcommittee consists of Senator Charles E. Grassley, Chairman (R.
Iowa), Senator HoweU Heflin, Ranking Minority Member (D. Ala.), Senator Paul Laxah
(R. Nev.), Senator Arlen Specter (R. Pa.), and Senator Max Baucus, (D. Mont.). The
hearings were held on June 23 and September 20, 1983.
See Administrative Law Judge Corps Act: Hearings on S.1l7.5 Before the Subcomm.
on At/minstrative Practice and Procedure o/Ihe Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1983) (hereinafter cited as Hearings on S. 117.5).
67. See id at 4-24. The panel consisted of Judge Edwin S. Bernstein, Judge Victor
W. Palmer, Chief Judge Duane R. Harves, and Judge Frank B. Borowiec.
68. The Federal Administrative Law Judges Conference (F AUC) includes nearly
800 members and represents judges in each of the twenty-nine federal agencies that hold
hearings conducted by administrative law judges. Id. at 4.
69. The National Conference of Administrative Law Judges includes both federal
and state administrative law judges as its members. It is a constituent of the American
Bar Association's Judicial Administration Division which, at its 1983 mid-year meeting,
passed a resolution favoring the establishment of federal administrative law judges as a
separate, independent and unified corps. Id.
70. The Association of Administrative Law Judges, Inc., represents the nearly 800
administrative law judges employed at the Social Security Administration. Id.
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subjected to ever-increasing civil penalties for breach of federal reg
ulations, and those otherwise dependent upon the fairness and im
partiality of hearings conducted by federal administrative law
judges.1 •
Judge Palmer noted that eight states have transferred their ad
ministrative law judges to independent central panels to eliminate
any dependency upon agencies whose programs are directly affected
by the judges' decisions. At the same time, the federal government
still assigns its administrative law judges to twenty-nine departments
and agencies where they are maintained and supported as
subordinate employees.12 He argued that transfer of federal admin
istrative law judges to an independent corps where each would be
assigned to a specialized division in accordance with his or her ex
pertise, combined the best features of the present system - speciali
zation and merit selection - with the following four improvements:
I. Public Perception

of Fairness of Hearings

Assigning judges to a separate, unified corps instead of individual
departments and agencies would eliminate the present public per
ception that administrative law judges, particularly those who were
previously staff members, have an institutional bias in favor of the
agency. Their separation from the departments and agencies who
often appear before them as parties would assure actual fairness and
impartiality, and restore the public's confidence that justice is indeed
being done.
2. More Efficient Use ofAdministrative Law Judges

Under the present system, the management of judges and cases is
divided among twenty-nine separate departments and agencies pre
cluding the effective assignment of administrative law judges in ac
cordance with the varying peaks and valleys in their case loads.
Establishing the judges as a unified corps would enable this highly
71. lri. at 30-35. The majority ofadministrative law judges in the federal govern
ment are no longer assigned to proceedings involving ratemaking, licensing, or the estab
lishment of agency rules and regulations. lri. at 28-29. As a chart attached to Judge
Palmer's testimony demonstrated, only 6.8 percent of them are presently so employed.
This is in marked contrast to the time of the APA's enactment when 63.8 percent were
assigned to such cases. lri. at 53. Currently, administrative law judges mainly preside
over adversarial type hearings and disputed claims in which the employing agency is a
real party-in-interest. The change has raised the level of judicial independence needed
for the administrative process to be just. lri. at 29-31.
72. lri. at 26, 31, 40-41.
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trained expert resource within the federal government to be effi
ciently employed to dispose of administrative proceedings.
3. Sign!ficant Cost Savings

The establishment of a unified corps would allow improved case
load management thereby reducing personnel requirements. Fur
thermore, substantial savings would be derived by eliminating the
replication of hearing facilities and support staffs at the twenty-nine
departments and agencies. Additional savings and increased pro
ductivity would be achieved through the use of modem office equip
ment and computers throughout the corps.
4. Availability of Administrative Law Judges to Assist Overloaded
Federal Courts

The bill expressly authorizes federal courts to refer specialized pro
ceedings to administrative law judges serving as special masters.
Under this provision, an existing cadre of administrative law judges
would be identified as being immediately available to assist the fed
eral judiciary and provide an inexpensive remedy to the pressing
problems now facing the federal courts. 73
Judge Duane R. Harves, Chief Hearing Examiner, State of
Minnesota, Office of Administrative Hearings, next testified in sup
port of the proposed legislation. He noted that on January 1, 1976,
Minnesota created a totally independent hearing agency similar to
the unified corps that Senate bill 1275 would establish. He stated
that the creation of the centralized Minnesota Office of Hearings had
dramatically decreased costs of hearings, increased efficiencies, and
decreased the time in which decisions were issued. 74 He testified that
the division of the office into areas of special expertise had preserved
specialization and, in every way, the Minnesota experience had been
73. Id. at 46.
74. Id. at 8-ll. Judge Harves supplied statistics showing that the cost of hearings
to the Minnesota Public Utilities Commission was reduced from $311,330 in fiscal year
1977, the first year his centralized hearings office was in operation, to $ 184,219 for fiscal
year 1982. The cost of hearings conducted for the Depanment of Commerce feU from
$ 120,000 to less than $60,000. Id. at 87. Despite inflation and the doubling of the sala
ries paid to hearing examiners, Minnesota has not had to increase the amounts budgeted
for his office's operation. Id. Moreover, the total staff was reduced by fony percent, with
the number of examiners reduced by twenty-seven percent. Id. at 88. The length of time
for decisions to be issued in workers' compensation cases feU from 101 days following the
close of the hearing record in December 1981, to fony-six days in May 1983; and, the
average backlog per examiner likewise decreased from fifteen cases to four cases. Id. at
89.
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a resounding success. 7S
The final panel member, Judge Borowiec, testified on behalf of
the Association of Administrative Law Judges, Inc., and its adminis
trative law judges employed at the Social Security Administration,
Department of Health and Human Services. 76 He reinforced Judge
Palmer's testimony and described the agency pressures that have
been brought to bear upon the judges at the Department of Health
and Human Services. 77 In their opinion, he advised, such agency
pressures squarely conflicted with the traditional American standard
of justice and the enactment of Senate bill 1275 was essential.
The next panel included Herbert E. Forrest, Esq., and Professor
Abraham Dash. Mr. Forrest is a partner in the Washington law firm
of Steptoe and Johnson and is President of the Federal Communica
tions Bar Association. Professor Dash is a member of the University
of Maryland Law School faculty and has written extensively in the
field of administrative law. Both Mr. Forrest and Professor Dash
supported the bill.
Mr. Forrest was critical of the present system under which ad
ministrative law judges "are housed, sustained, and are ranked as
(agency) employees. . . . [N]ot only are they seen as having, but
7S. Id. at 9-10. Although unable to appear in person, Judge Howard H. Kestin,
Director, State of New Jersey Office of Administrative Law, reported similar dramatic
benefits under the New Jersey centralized system established in early 1979. Since that
time, the number of hearing officers has decreased from 130 to forty-five, each of whom
disposed of an average of 226 cases in fiscal year 1982. Despite inflation, the average cost
of processing a case decreased from SS40 in fiscal year 1980 to SS08 in fiscal year 1982.
Id. at 7S-77.
76. At present, there are 769 administrative law judges at this agency.
77. See SUBCOMM. ON OVERSIGHT OF GoV'T MANAGEMENT OF THE SENATE
COMM. ON GOV'TAL AFFAIRS, THE ROLE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE IN THE TITLE
II SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY INSURANCE PROORAM, S. REp. No. III, 98th Cong., 1st
Scss. (1983) [hereinafter cited as THE ROLE OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE).
Based upon the hearing the Subcommittee conducted on this issue on June 8, 1983, its
Chairman, Senator William S. Cohen and Ranking Minority Member, Senator Carl
Levin, reported:
The Subcommittee's principal finding is that the SSA is pressuring its adminis
trative law judges to reduce the rate at which they allow disabled persons to
participate in or continue to participate in the Social Security disability pro
gram. (The SSA has been successful in its efforts as evidenced by recent statis
tics showing a dramatic decline in the administrative law judge allowance rate
in the past year and a half from 67.2 percent in mid-1982, to S 1.9 percent in
June 1983). The Subcommittee also finds that the SSA is imposing this pressure
through several means including the inequitable and unjustified targeting of
only allowance decisions and high allowance judges for review pursuant to an
amendment sponsored by Senator Henry Bellmon and passed in 1980 (Bellmon
Review), and the usc of minimum production quotas and productivity goals.
Id. at III.
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they do in fact have, however unconsciously, a bias toward the
agency which is often a party to the proceeding, and a partiality to
ward the view of agency staff."78 On the merits of whether judges
should be specialists, Mr. Forrest stated:
[I]t makes all trial and appellate judges the greater for their expe
rience that they do not sit with the narrow tunnel vision of special
ization, but are exposed, not only to new ideas, and new
situations, but also to different views and perceptions of old issues,
for example, how different agencies look at ratemaking to derive a
more comprehensive, balanced and creative decision. It may not
be something that can be demonstrated empirically, but I believe
it's there. 79
Professor Dash stated that the concept of a unified corps of ad
ministrative law judges had been one that was proposed as far back
as 1946 when the Administrative Procedure Act came into being,
and the essential question was not whether a unified corps of federal
administrative law judges should be enacted, but, why it still had not
been enacted. 80
The final witness at the initial hearing was Loren A. Smith,
Chairman, Administrative Conference of the United States. Chair
man Smith listed the chief benefits of Senate bill 1275 as increased
efficiency, cost savings, greater public confidence in the impartiality
and independence of administrative law judges, and diversification
of the judges' experience. He further observed that it would allow an
objective, credible system to be designed for evaluating the judges'
performance, and could lead to a more unified, coherent approach
by Congress to agency adjudication. As for the bill's negative impli
cations, he cited reduced expertise, the creation of a new bureau
cracy, unforeseen interference with the ultimate decisional
responsibility of individual agencies, and the need to devise an equi
table system for allocating the judges to the agencies. The latter
could be allocated by pro rata sharing of adjudicative costs, to pre
vent drawing too liberally upon the judges' services when not actu
ally needed. On balance, he favored the corps concept embodied in
the bill on efficiency grounds, and suggested that an experimental
model might be created first for a four year trial period, to include
only those judges in the fifteen smallest agencies. 81
78.
79.
80.
8!.

Hearings on S. 1275, supra note 66, at 97.
Id.
Id. at 98.
Id. at \08-12. The Administrative Conference consists of ninety-one members
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At the second hearing on September 20, 1983, Mr. Geoffrey S.
Stewart and Mr. Joseph A. Morris testified for the Department of
Justice and the Office of Personnel Management. 82
Mr. Stewart offered the view of the Department of Justice that a
change of such magnitude in the national administrative judiciary
called for thorough reflection and detailed empirical study. In the
Department's opinion, administrative law judges presently had suffi
cient protections to assure their independence. 83 He also expressed
concern that the proposal would create a "generalist corps" of ad
ministrative law judges, and would "unnecessarily impede the im
plementation of agency policies."84 Finally, he presented objections
to several details of the bill. He took issue with the creation of a
collegially functioning Council consisting of the Corps' chief judge
and division chiefs as a means of governing the Corps' operation and
appointment of new administrative law judges; the creation of a
Complaints Resolution Board to discipline judges under a system of
peer review; and the creation of a Judicial Nomination Commission
to recommend qualified administrative law judges for presidential
appointments as members of the Council.
Mr. Morris argued that the legislation would dilute the agency
program expertise of administrative law judges and agencies would
not be able to rely upon timely processing of hearing requests. He
emphasized that there was a need for "agency administrative control
over [administrative law judges)."8s Additionally, he objected to the
bill's salary provisions.
Althea T. Simmons, Director of the Washington Bureau of Na
tional Association for the Advancement of Colored People ques
tioned whether the bill would promote the independence of
administrative law judges or increase their efficiency. In her opin
ion, the Administrative Procedure Act amply insulated administra
and twenty-two liaison representatives. It includes representatives of federal depart
ments and agencies, the private bar, law schools, and professional associations. One of
the authors serves as a liaison representative to the Administrative Conference as Presi
dent of the Federal Administrative Law Judges Conference.
82. Mr. Stewart is Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Policy at
Department of Justice. Id. at 125. Mr. Morris is General Counsel at Office of Personnel
Management. Id. at 137.
83. Id. at 126. Jonathan C. Rose, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Pol
icy, clarified that the testimony given on behalf of the Department of Justice "does not
reflect any disagreement with the laudable objectives of the bill's proponents. . . ."
Letter from Jonathan C. Rose to Victor W. Palmer (Dec. 13, 1983).
84. Hearmgs on S. 1275, supra note 66, at 126, 127.
85. Id. at 141.
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tive law judges from inappropriate agency control. She
acknowledged, however, that with respect to the Social Security
judges, "the intrusion of that agency upon the decisional indepen
dence of the administrative law judges appears highly inappropri
ate."86 The more desirable legislative cure for that problem, in her
opinion, was to establish an independent Health and Human Serv
ices Review Commission to which all Social Security judges should
be transferred. She was also skeptical as to the advantages of judi
cial "generalists" over "specialists" and expressed concern regarding
the potential for politicization of a unified corps of administrative
law judges. 87
Next, John T. Miller, Jr., an attorney with many years of experi
ence in administrative law, testified in support of the Bill. 88 Mr.
Miller declared that an administrative law judge corps would assure
uniform work loads, thereby enabling better use of administrative
law judge time. At present, he continued, each agency and depart
ment determines whether funds will be provided for the continuing
legal education of their administrative law judges. "At a time when
the judiciary throughout the nation has come to recognize the value
of such education in terms of more effective and efficient administra
tion of justice, there is an obvious deficiency in the opportunities in
the funding of continuing education for federal [administrative law
judges]."89 He expressed confidence that a unified corps would bet
ter attend to the need for continuing education and training of ad
ministrative law judges. Mr. Miller added that emphasis on
expertise is often a misplaced value, stressing the example of federal
courts where specific expertise has not been a necessary qualification
of judges who review agency decisions.
Acting on behalf of an ad hoc committee of fifteen federal ad
ministrative law judges who favored continuation of the status quo,
Judge Joseph B. Kennedy testified that the current process provided
for sufficient independence of federal administrative law judges.90
He contended that the situation at Social Security was the only
known circumstance in which administrative law judges had been
subjected to an inappropriate degree of agency control. He sug
gested that the establishment of an independent review commission
to house Social Security judges would be a more appropriate re
86. Id. at 165.
87. Id. at 165-67.
88. Id. at 152.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 156.
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sponse to that problem. He disagreed that the bill would result in
substantial savings; rather the proposal would "interfere with the
agency's ability to perform the functions for which they were cre
ated."91 In his opinion, although the bill purported to create special
ized divisions, the existence of those divisions would be temporary
and readily altered by vote of the Council of the Corps. He con
cluded that the proposal would create an unwieldy bureaucracy re
quiring additional employees.
The next witness was Robert H. Joost who testified as a private
citizen supporting the creation of a unified corps of administrative
law judges. He remarked that an administrative law judge's federal
agency employer almost always appeared before the judge as a liti
gant and that this necessarily created the appearance of unfairness.
Similarly, appropriate agency disciplining of a judge was difficult be
cause it might appear to have improperly affected his or her judicial
independence. Mr. Joost then submitted wide-ranging recommen
dations he believed would improve the bill: transferring responsibil
ity for examining future applicants from OPM to the Corps;
expanding the types of legal experience which would qualify appli
cants; further dividing the divisions of the Corps into more special
ized subdivisions or panels; and, creating a class of GS 13/14
"Administrative Examiners" to hear less important cases thereby
creating a career ladder for administrative law judges.92
The final witness, Professor Victor G. Rosenblum testified that
in his 1975 study for the Administrative Conference of the United
States, he recommended that the time was not yet right for the crea
tion of an administrative law judge corps. As a witness in 1983,
however, he stated: "I'm convinced that now is the hour for such a
COrpS."93 He then reviewed his rationale in 1975 and explained how
three of the four factors which accounted for his position at that time
had significantly changed between 1975 and 1983.The factor he
found unchanged was proof that the operation of the administrative
law judge program would not be impaired by political corruption or
./

91. Id at 184.
92. Id. at 191-93. Mr. Joost is a former member of the professional staff of the
Senate Judiciary Committee and at present is a hearing officer for the Commodity Fu
tures Trading Commission.
93. Id. at 194. Professor Rosenblum has been a professor of law at Northwestern
University since 1958, is a past chairman of the Administrative Law Section of the Amer
ican Bar Association, and is the current vice-president of the American Judicature Soci
ety. His article entitled Contexl.l and Contents of "Fo, Good Cause" As Criterion fo,
Removal of Administ,ative Law Judges: Legal and Policy Facto,s also appears in this

symposium.
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other improper infiuences. 94
One factor which had changed was the failure of a compromise
made between the Administrative Conference and the Civil Service
Commission in 1962. Under that compromise the Administrative
Conference had refrained from recommending removal of the hear
ing examiner program from the Commission on the basis of its
promise to institute improvements responsive to a detailed critique
of the Commission's operation of the program by Professor Wilbur
Lester, then staff director of the Administrative Conference's Com
mittee on Personne1. 9S Professor Rosenblum stated that the Com
mission's promise was not kept:
The period of constructive implementation of the Conference"s
1962 recommendation which was exemplified by such promising
steps as utilization of a comprehensive written examination, in
volvment of renowned practitioners and members of the academic
community in the oral phase of the examination, addition of trial
experience as one basis for qualification for appointment, and es
tablishment of the La Macchia Committee to study multiple
dimensions of the status and utilization of administrative law
judges, has long since lapsed into limbo.
The change in agency title in 1979 from Civil Service Com
mission to Office of Personnel Management and the division of
functions between OPM and the Merit Systems Protection Board
wrought no concomitant renewal of reformist energy or zeal. . . .
General Accounting Office studies of management of the ad
ministrative law process offer no reason to believe that [OPM] has
made a salient priority of the implementation or evaluation of
proposals for improving roles, functions and performance of [ad
ministrative law judges]. On the contrary, GAO has been overtly
critical of management of the administrative law process.96

Another factor which had changed was the development of em
pirical data substantiating the achievement of major benefits through
implementation of central panel systems in seven states. The new
evidence, he found, demonstrated "clearly that the corps concept is
practicable and feasible."97
94. Id
95. Id.

at

194-95; see W.

LESTER, REPORT ON SECTION

II

HEARING EXAMINERS TO

THE COMMITTEE ON PERSONNEL OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED
STATES

28 (1962).

96. Hearings on S. 1275, supra note 66, at 195-96.
97. Id. at 196-97. The seven States are California. Colorado, Florida, Massachu
setts, Minnesota, New Jersey and Tennessee. See generally M. RICH & W. BRUCAR, THE
CENTRAL PANEL SYSTEM FOR ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES: A SURVEY OF SEVEN
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Professor Rosenblum concluded that the Civil Service Commis
sion and its successor, the Office of Personnel Management, had
failed to follow through on the LaMacchia Committee recommenda
tions98 and failed to develop an effective administrative law judge
program: a "fresh start through the corps concept is warranted,
promising and practicable in Senate bill 1275."99
V.

THE ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST ENACTMENT

Persuasive arguments for the establishment of federal adminis
trative law judges as an independent, unified corps through enact
ment of Senate bill 1275 have been advanced by the practicing
bar,lOo eminent professors of law,101 and the administrative law
judges.102
Opponents, however, argue that with the exception of the Social
Security Administration (SSA), there is no evidence of agency inter
ference with the judicial functions of administrative law judges.
They suggest that the more appropriate legislative response would be
to vest jurisdiction over social security cases in a new, independent
review commission to which administrative law judges now em
ployed by SSA would be transferred. Additionally, opponents have
articulated fears that enactment of the bill will lead to politicization
of the administrative law judge system, a reduction of agency effi
ciency through agency loss of control of their dockets, the replace
ment of "specialists" by "generalists," and the creation of an even
more expensive, unwieldy bureaucracy.103
The strength of the arguments favoring the Corps' establish
ment perhaps are measured best in the context of these doubts and
fears.
A.

Interference With Judicial Functions
Judges by Agency Employers

ofAdministrative Law

Witnesses who testified in support of the Heflin bill did not unSTATES (1983). The State of Washington, on July I, 1982, became the eighth State to
employ a central panel system.
98. Hearings on S. 117.5, supra note 66, at 197-98. See supra note 37 and accompa
nying text. This study was conducted by a panel of administrative law judges chaired by
the Civil Service Commission's then Deputy Counsel.
99. Hearings on S. 117.5, supra note 66, at 198.
100. See supra text accompanying notes 88-89.
101. See supra text accompanying note 92-99.
102. See supra text accompanying notes 67-77.
103. See supra text accompanying notes 82-87.
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dertake a comprehensive survey of practices at every federal depart
ment and agency which interfere with the judicial functions of
administrative law judges in their employ. The focus on agency in
terference and pressuring was restricted to the practices at the SSA,
the current subject of extensive media coverage lO4 and a congres
sional oversight hearing which resulted in the issuance of a severely
critical report. lOS
The report documented SSA's pressuring of its administrative
law judges to decide against claims by the disabled. I06 It charged
that pressure was exerted through the use of minimum production
quotas, targeting decisions by high allowance judges for agency re
view, improperly using internal guidelines to bind its judges, and
prohibiting them from following selected court precedents. 107 A
New York Times editorial 108 also charged that these practices by the
SSA were in response to a decision by the administration to elimi
nate fraudulent claims and reduce the $18 billion year expended to
pay 4 million workers and their dependents. SSA's responsiveness to
the administration's policies caused it to use its position as the em
ployer of administrative law judges to interfere with their judicial
functions. 109
Every federal agency where administrative law judges are em
ployed is motivated to be responsive to its administration's policies.
It is more difficult, however, to document equivalent pressuring by
other agencies. Because SSA employs 769 administrative law
judges 110 in approximately 100 offices, it necessarily communicates
its policy in writing. Other agencies, that have a smaller cadre of
judges located in a single office, communicate orally. Even so, in
stances of interference with the judicial functions of administrative
law judges by other agencies have surfaced. I I I
In 1976, the Undersecretary of the Interior disagreed with a de
104. See, e.g., Give Ine Disahled a Grand/alner, N.Y. Times, Oct. 18, 1983, at A30,
col. I.; Public Broadcasting Station Documentary, Who Decides Disability? (June 20,
1983) (Transcript available through WGBH-TV, 125 Western Avenue, Boston MA
02134).
105. See supra note 77.

106.
107.
108.
109.

Id.
Id.
Give tile Disahled a Grand/alher, N.Y. Times, Oct. 18, 1983, at A30, col. I.
Id.

110. OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT, TOTAL NUMBER OF AUs ON BOARD
BY GRADE AND AGENCY AS OF Nov. 21, 1983 (1984).
III. 43 Op. All'y Gen. I (1977).
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cision by an administrative law judge at that agency.ll2 Instead of
simply reversing the decision, as was the agency's right, the Under
secretary placed an official reprimand in the judge's personnel file,
placing the judge's qualifications under a cloud and hindering his
opportunities for future promotion or new employment. The repri
mand was later expunged pursuant to an opinion by the Attorney
General, but only after the expenditure of considerable legal fees
which the Federal Administrative Law Judges Conference helped to
defray. In finding that the reprimand confiicted with the APA, the
Attorney General nonetheless recognized the right of an agency to
reprimand its judges as well as its right "to assign or withhold park
ing spaces, . . . establish working hours, [and) assign secretarial
assistance." 113
Administrative law judges at every federal agency are vulnera
ble to such discipline. The fact that wrongful actions may eventually
be reversed after. costly litigation provides little comfort.
Although the APA requires administrative law judges to be as
signed to cases in rotation, 114 the Supreme Court in Ramspeck inter
preted the modifying words "so far as practicable" to allow
assignments on the basis of "the experience and ability of the exam
iner available."11!1 This interpretation has permitted questionable
agency practices in making case assignments. PATCO v. Federal La
bor Relations Authority ,I 16 contains a disturbing finding respecting
the assignment of the Air Controller's strike case: "On August 4,
1981 [Federal Labor Relations Authority (FLRA) members) ... met
with [FLRA's Chief Administrative Law Judge). . . at lunch to dis
cuss the procedural aspects of the PATCO case. During that discus
sion, it was suggested that [the Chief Judge) ... appoint a capable
judge, preferably himself, to hear the PATCO case. . . ."117
FLRA's Chief Judge complied and assigned the case to himself.
On September 5, 1980, in a hearing before the Consumer Sub
committee of the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and
Transportation, FTC's Chief Judge testified that all eleven of the
FTC's administrative law judges, at one time or another, served as
staff attorneys at the Commission. ll.s He further confirmed that in
112. la.
1l3. la.

114. 5. U.S.C. § 3105 (1982).
115. 345 U.S. at 139-40.
116. 685 F.2d 547 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
117. la. at 619.
118. Administrative Law Juage System: Hearings Before tlte Suhcomm. for Consum
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August 1978, the FTC judge assigned to a case involving the Kellogg
Company 119 advised the agency of his plans to retire. The FTC re
tained him on the case through a special contract which gave him
both his pension and salary while he served "at the will of the ap
pointing officer."12o Kellogg, upon being informed of the arrange
ment, vigorously objected and the judge was replaced. 121
Agency rules of practice are typically prepared by their general
counsel. This can result in rules that favor the agency over the other
parties who may appear before its administrative law judges.l 22 The
Heflin bill's provisions for the establishment of uniform rules of
practice by the Corps, led one agency official to make this enlighten
ing protest:
§ 565(d)(7) authorizes the policymaking body of the Corps to
"prescribe the rules of practice and procedure for the conduct of
proceedings before the Corps." As Oliver Wendell Holmes once
said, "substantive law is secreted in the interstices of procedure."
The effect of § 565(d)(7) will be to surrender, in subtle ways, part
of the Agency's substantive rule making authority to the Corps. 123

The NLRB's rules of practice were before the Supreme Court in
NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co. 124 which upheld the board's
right to bar prehearing discovery. However, this one-sided aspect of
its rules of practice evoked the following comment from Justice
Powell:
I do not read the Act to authorize agencies to adopt or adhere to
nonstatutory rules barring all prehearing disclosure of investiga
tory records. The Court reasons, . . . that such disclosure 
which is deemed "premature" only because it is in advance of the
time of release set by the agency - will enable "suspected viola
tors" . . . to learn the Board's case in advance and frustrate the
ers ofthe Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 96th Cong., 2d Sess.
117 (1980) (Statement of Ernest Barnes, C.A.L.J., F.T.C.) [hereinafter cited as 1980
Hearings).
119. Kellogg Co., 99 F.T.C. 8 (1982).
120. 1980 Hearings, supra note 118, at 117.
121. /d.
122. The Depanment of Agriculture's rules of practice, for example, prohibit its
administrative law judges from dismissing on the pleadings, any of the complaints De
panment lawyers file in enforcement proceedings. 7 C.F.R. § 1.143(b) (1983). Con
versely, in proceedings where Agriculture defends petitions seeking relief, the judges are
directed to entenain its motions to dismiss petitions for being defective in form. Id.
§ 9OO.S2(c).
123. Environmental Protection Agency Memorandum from Ronald L. McCaUum,
Judicial Officer, to Virginia Gibbons, Office of Legislation (July 14, 1983).
124. 437 U.S. 214 (1978).
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proceedings or construct defenses which would permit violations
to go unremedied. . . . This assumption is not only inconsistent
with the congressional judgment expressed in the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure that "trial by ambush"... may well disserve the
cause of truth, but it also threatens to undermine the Act's overall
presumption of disclosure, at least during the pendancy of en
forcement proceedings. 12S

The Senate Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Man
agement described SSA's refusal to accord precedential weight to se
lected court decisions as a policy of "non-acquiescence."'26 This
policy of non-acquiescence is not limited to SSA.127 The right of
agencies to engage in these policies involves complex and difficult
constitutional questions. 128 Enactment of Senate bill 1275 would not
in itself resolve the constitutional problems, but its provisions do call
for a study, division by division, examining the ways in which agen
cies review decisions by administrative law judges. This kind of re
view undertaken by the Corps' Council would indeed be an
important first step.
Even if no constitutional issues existed, when an agency directs
its administrative law judges to ignore otherwise binding court
precedents, the judges are being asked to give priority to their duties
as employees over their judicial responsibility. 129
125. Id. at 253 (Powell, J., concurring and dissenting) (citations omitted).
126. See supra note 77.
127. The Subcommittee indicated that SSA argued "its policy was no different
than that of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS)." THE ROLE OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW JUDGE, supra note 77, at 27.
128. The subcommittee report referred to three principal constitutional issues: (1)
the doctrine of separation of powers; (2) the doctrine of slare decisis; and (3) the due
process rights of litigants. Id. at 28-29. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137
(1803); Yellow Taxi Co. of Minn. v. NLRB, 721 F.2d 366 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Frock v.
United States R.R. Retirement Bd., 685 F.2d 1041 (7th Cir. 1982), cerl denied, 103 S. Ct.
1185 (1982); S & H Riggers & Erectors, Inc. v. OSHRC, 659 F.2d 1273 (5th Cir. 1981);
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v. Marshall, 636 F.2d 32, 33 (3d Cir. 1980); ITT World
Communications v. FCC, 635 F.2d 32, 43 (2d Cir. 1980); Ithaca College v. NLRB, 623
F.2d 224,228-29 (2d Cir.), uri. denied, 449 U.S. 975 (1980); Mary Thompson Hosp., Inc.
v. NLRB, 621 F.2d 458,864 (7th Cir. 1980); Allegheny Gen. Hosp. v. NLRB, 608 F.2d
965, 970 (3d Cir. 1979); see also Siedlecki v. Schweiker, 563 F. Supp. 43, 46-48 (W.D.
Wash. 1983); Chee v. Schweiker, 563 F. Supp. 1362, 1364-65 (D. Ariz. 1983); Hillhouse v.
Harris, 547 F. Supp. 88,93 (W.D. Ark. 1982), affd, 715 F.2d 428 (1983).
129. The Senate Subcommittee stated the problem as follows:
The (administrative law judges] are also detrimentally affected by the SSA's
policy of non-acquiescence. The (administrative law judges) predicament was
described in Hillhouse v. Harris, when the court indicated that the [administra
tive law judges) are caught in the most unenviable position of "trying to serve
two masters; the courts and the Secretary of Health and Human Services."
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The problem caused by agency refusals 130 to accede to court de
cisions interpretory of the laws agencies administer was stated by
Professor Jaffe:
The scope of judicial review is ultimately conditioned and deter
mined by the major proposition that the constitutional courts of
this country are the acknowledged architects and guarantors of the
integrity of the legal system. . . . An agency is not an island en
tire of itself. . . . The very subordination of the agency to judi
cial jurisdiction is intended to proclaim the premise that each
agency is to be brought into harmony with the totality of the
law;... 131

B. Po/ilicizalion
Those who would maintain the status quo argue that the Corps'
establishment must ultimately lead to destruction of the present sys
tem for merit appointment of federal administrative law judges.
They fear that as administrative law judges stand separate and apart
from agencies, and have heightened visibility, there will be a con
comitant increase in pressures to discard the merit selection system.
They view the bill's provisions for Presidential appointment of the
chief judge and division chiefs as a template which will eventually
apply to all administrative law judge appointments. 132
The fear is unfounded. The bill does not alter the present sysMoreover, this situation is demoralizing to the [administrative law judges) who
know that their judicial efforts may be meaningless. If they adhere to the SSA's
non-acquiescence ruling, their decisions may be overturned in Federal court
because they failed to follow prededent; and if they adhere to the courts' deci
sions, their decisions may be overturned by the SSA through the Appeals Coun
cil. To say the least, this practice creates a professional and judicial quandary
for the [administrative law judge)."
THE ROLE OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE, supra note 77, at 30.
130. In Yellow Taxi Company of Minneapolis v. NLRB, 721 F.2d 366 (D.C. Cir.
1983), the court stated: "No court can overlook an agency's defiant refusal to follow well
established law . . . . Some members of the Board have historically arrogated to them
selves the authority to 'disagree' with judicial precedent." Id. at 382. In justifying its
refusal to give precedential weight to a decision by a United States circuit court, another
agency explained the decision was the result of "judicial illiteracy," or the court "was so
busy that it brushed the case aside in order to avoid the onerous chore of giving full
consideration to the case," or was an attempt to avoid "summary reversal by the
Supreme Court" through "disguise" of the court's real motive. In re Shatkin, 34 Agric.
Dec. 296, 307-\3 (1979) (discussing Economou v. USDA, 494 F.2d 519 (2d Cir. 1974».
131. Butt v. Glover Livestock Comm'n Co., 411 U.S. 182, 190-91 (1973) (Stewart,
J., dissenting) (quoting L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 589
90 (1965».
132. See supra text accompanying notes 82-87 & 90-91.
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tem of merit selection of administrative law judges. 133 Nor is there
any reason to believe that its passage will lead to modification of this
system.
The bill requires council members to be selected from adminis
trative law judges who possess five years prior experience. Screening
of applicants would be administered by a panel selected by two fed
eral judges, the Chairman of ACUS, and leading members of the bar
and the administrative law judge community.134 These require
ments, taken together, make it unlikely that the positions will go to
those whose only qualification is loyalty to the political party in
power. Moreover, provisions in the bill for processing complaints of
incompetence or misconduct are equally applicable to council mem
bers and may be instituted by anyone, including administrative law
judges who believe their functions have been improperly influenced
by council members. us
It has also been suggested that placing administrative law
judges under the control of politically appointed division chiefs and
the chief judge, will lead to politicization of the Corps, but such a
system would be far less enmeshed in politics than the present one
which subordinates the judges to political appointees. Currently
agency heads are committed to the policies of the administration in
office, whereas the chief judge and division chiefs of an independent
Corps would have no such commitments.
C. Reduced EffiCiency When Agencies Lose Control of Their
Dockets and "Generalists" Replace "Specialists"
Critics of the bill insist that because a unified corps will not be
as responsive to agency needs and priorities, case backlogs must re
sult unless agencies retain control over the dockets. 136 As with any
other government agency, however, the Corps will be answerable to
the President and the Congress for budgeted funds and must be re
sponsive to such criticisms. Virtually every tribunal has procedures
for according time priorities to matters requiring expedited treat
ment. 137 Similar procedures could be mandated for the Corps.
133. See S. 1275, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1983) (proposing codification at 5
U.S.C. § 567(a».
134. See kI. § 4.
135. See kI. § 2 (proposing codification at 5 U.S.c. § 569).
136. See Hearings on S. J]7J, supra note 66, at 133-35 (statement of Geoffrey S.
Stewart, Deputy Assistant AU'y Gen., Office of Legal Policy, Dep't of Justice); id. at 294
95 (statement of C.M. Butler III, Chairman, FERC).
137. Rule 12 of Uniform Rules of Procedure for Boards of Contract Appeals under
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When the Comptroller General studied the administrative law pro
cess, he concluded that the delays that have plagued it are not attrib
utable to administrative law judges. There are two major causes for
delays in the administrative process - extensive agency review of
administrative law judges' decisions and the use of more complex
judicial procedures than necessary to resolve some disputes."138 The
positive aspect of reduction in agency control over dockets is that
opportunities to manipulate or predict case assignments would end.
Agency officials have also voiced concern that program exper
tise may be lost through the Corps' establishment. The bill, how
ever, recognizes the importance of specialized expertise and provides
for its continuance. The Corps would initially consist of seven divi
sions which the Council could expand to ten. The Council could
also. achieve ,more intensive specialization within the divisions
through regulations establishing special panels or sections.
The Corps' divisions have been structured in accordance with
major specialties of administrative law. Judges presently employed
by federal agencies would be assigned to divisions on the basis of
their existing legal ~xpertise. The powers conferred upon the Corps'
Council permit it to require new judges or judges seeking transfers to
participate in appropriate training programs prior to assignment to a
division.139 Optimally, a division chief would assign complex cases
from an agency to judges who previously served there or otherwise
have proven expertise in that area. As each judge acquired experi
ence in new fields of expertise, all would eventually be qualified to
hear any case assigned to the division.
Many knowledgeable educators, practitioners and members of
the judiciary unequivocally state that the importance of specializa
tion is overemphasized. Those who advocate to the contrary, exag
gerate the time it would take to learn various specialties of
administrative law. l40 As John T. Miller, a private practitioner of
the Contract Disputes Act of 1978, promulgated by Office of Management and Budget
for all federal boards of contract appeals, establishes both expedited procedures for small
claims and accelerated procedures for various other cases. 10 C.F.R. § 1023.20 (1983).
138. COMPTROLLER GENERAL'S REPORT TO THE CONGRESS, ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW PROCESS: BETTER MANAGEMENT Is NEEDED, FPCD078·25, Cover Sheet (May 15,
1978). See a/so COMPTROLLER GENERAL'S REPORT TO THE CONGRESS, MANAGEMENT
IMPROVEMENTS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW PROCESS: MUCH REMAINS TO BE DONE,
FPCD-79-44 (May 27, 1979) (follow-up report).
139. S. 1275, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1983) (proposing codification at 5 U.S.C.
§ 561).
140. One of the authors of this article serves the Department of Agriculture which
administers no less than fifty separate statutes. Each time the responsibility for a statute
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law who testified at the Senate Judiciary Committee hearing as
serted: "It has not been in the Anglo-American tradition to appoint
lawyers as judges on the basis of a narrow, and, perhaps, temporary
expertise. . . . No lawyer should be appointed an [Administrative
Law Judge] who lacks the energy, intellect and discipline to acquire
needed expertise." 141
D.

The Corps Will Not Be a More Expensive, Unwieldy
Bureaucracy

There is a current perception that an agency, once created, rap
idly expands its staff and budget to become a self-perpetuating em
pire. This is the ratio decidendi of the new sunset laws designed to
cause agencies to self-destruct unless they can affirmatively demon
strate their ongoing usefulness. Those who oppose the establishment
of administrative law judges as an independent, unified corps, pro
ject a similar self-aggrandizing scenario.
But the work of the Corps will never be of its own making.
Every adjudicative function Congress entrusts to the Executive
Branch creates a correlative need for fair and impartial arbiters. The
proposed legislation merely assembles, under one supervisory au
thority, those who hear APA-type proceedings. The work will be
there whether or not the Corps is established. The costs of con
ducting proceedings with a corps in place should be less than under
the present system.
There is no practical method at present for assigning judges to
proceedings in a meaningful relationship to the actual case loads at
each agency. Offsetting peaks and valleys in agency needs for hear
ings by administrative law judges are not now adjusted.
The OPM administered loan program has not solved this prob
or program has been added or taken away, the variety of cases heard by the department's
judges changes. The administrative law judges at the Department of Labor also hear and
decide an equivalently large variety of cases under diverse statutes and regulations. Typ
ical of a number of administrative law judges who have been able to quickly adapt to
differing areas of expertise during the course of their judicial careers, the other author of
this article has specialized as a member of a board of contract appeals in government
procurement law and as an administrative law judge at several agenCies where he has
decided labor-management, workers' compensation, child-labor, and other cases for the
Department of Labor; civil penalty cases for the Federal Mine Safety and Health Review
Commission; false advertising cases for the Postal Service; and debarment cases for the
Small Business Administration (SBA). The SBA debarment cases were heard pursuant
to a loan program administered by the Office of Personnel Management, under which
many judges have quickly and successfully adapted to cases of administrative law com
pletely disparate from those they normally hear and decide.
141. Heari"gs 0" S. 1275, supra note 66, at 173.
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lem. Although an excellent theoretical solution, it conflicts with
pragmatic agency concerns. The same reason given by many agen
cies in opposition to the Corps' establishment - lack of agency con
trol- often persuades agencies to assign non-APA protected in-house
employees to hearings, where possible, rather than borrowing un
known administrative law judges. More importantly, lending agen
cies must concede that their judges are underworked, which could
imply that they have too many judges, prosecuting attorneys and
other personnel, and could result in reductions in appropriated funds
and staff.
The establishment of a corps should not increase any of the ma
jor costs of maintaining administrative law judges. These costs con
sist of payroll, physical facilities and travel. The Corps' anticipated
consolidation of functions and elimination of duplication should de
crease each of these cost components. Merely because the Corps will
be a new agency does not mean there will be additional costs. At
present, administrative law judges frequently make arrangements
through the General Services Administration for the use of hearing
room facilities. 142 There would be no change in this practice. The
vast majority of administrative law judges are presently located
throughout the nation in GSA owned or leased buildings. There
would be no reason to move those judges.
The eventual consolidation of administrative law judges located
in Washington will decrease costs by reducing the number of square
feet required for hearing rooms, libraries, etc. The bill provides for
the transfer of support personnel from agencies that now employ ad
ministrative law judges. Therefore, the establishment of a corps will
not result in the hiring of additional personnel. The employment of
modem computers and other equipment by the Corps should even
tually reduce the size of its staff.
These anticipated cost savings have been experienced in states
which have implemented similar centralized systems of administra
tive adjudication. 143 Furthermore, as public confidence in the ad
ministrative judiciary is increased, appeals to federal courts should
142. Each United States district court maintains little used courtrooms in cities
where it infrequently sits. The United States Tax Court has hearing rooms in most major
cities that are frequently idle and available. State and local governments are also gener
aUy cooperative. In addition, a special law school training program, participated in by
both authors, has been recently developed by the ABA's National Conference of Admin
istrative Law Judges in which agency hearings are conducted before students in law
schools' moot court facilities, after which the presiding administrative law judge lectures
on the practical aspects of administrative law.
143. See supra notes 74, 7S & 96.
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decrease with resulting cost savings to both the executive and the
judicial branches of the federal government.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Enactment of the Heflin bill would rectify a fundamental con
tlict between requisites of the Constitution and the present system for
employment of federal administrative law judges.
They are presently housed as subordinate employees of agencies
which may be motivated to interfere with judicial functions. The
most striking example of actual interference is provided by the So
cial Security Administration. These practices condict with the Due
Process Clause of the Constitution;l44
It is no answer to these arguments that the agency interferences
were in pursuit of honorable ends which the agency sought to imple
ment in the most efficient manner. "Indeed, one might fairly say of
the Bill of Rights in general and the Due Process Clause in particu
lar, that they were designed to protect the fragile values of a vulnera
ble citizenry from the overbearing concern for efficiency and efficacy
which may characterize praiseworthy government officials." 145
Eight states have now recognized that the role of the adminis
trative judiciary is inconsistent with their employment by individual
regulatory agencies and departments of the executive branch. 146 The
use of central panel systems by those states have proven successful
.and saved money. There is every reason to believe that the federal
government would enjoy similar cost savings by establishing its ad
ministrative law judges as an independent, unified corps.
Bernard G. Segal, past president of the American Bar Associa
tion, perhaps best explained the essential reason why an independent
administrative judiciary is needed:
Consider, for example, the unavoidable appearance of bias when
144. A fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process. Fairness,
of course, requires an absence of actual bias in the trial of cases. Our system of law has
always endeavored to prevent even the probability of unfairness. The Supreme Court has
said that "[e)very procedure which would offer a possible temptation to the average man
as a judge. . .not to hold the balance nice, clear and true between the State and the
accused, denies the latter due process oflaw." Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 532 (1927).
Such a stringent rule may sometimes bar trial by judges who, having no actual bias,
attempt to weigh the scales of justice equally between contending parties. In order to
perform its high function in the best way '~ustice must satisfy the appearance of justice."
Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. II, 14 (1954); In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136
(1955).
145. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656 (1972).
146. See supra note 97.
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an administrative law judge, attached to an agency, is presiding in
litigation by that agency against a private party. One can fill the
pages of the United States Code with legislation intended to guar
antee the independence of the administrative law judge; but so
long as that judge has offices in the same building as the agency
staff, so long as the seal of the agency adorns the bench on which
that judge sits, so long as that judge's assignment to the case is by
the very agency whose actions or contentions that judge is being
called on to review, it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, for
that judge to convey the image of being an impartial fact finder.
A truly competent and impartial administrative judiciary is a
precious prize indeed. But even more than a prize, such an ad
ministrative judiciary is essential if our administrative justice sys
tem is to function successfully under the crushing weight of new
legislation and new cases and in the fishbowl environment in
which all of government finds itself as we embark upon our third
century as a nation. 141

The authors join with Mr. Segal and the many other distin
guished members of the bar who favor the corps concept. We be
lieve that enactment of the Hedin bill will assure the fairness of
administrative adjudications and result in more efficient employ
ment of administrative law judges with consequental cost savings to
the federal government.

147.

Segal, The Administrative Lo.,., Judge, 62 A.B.A. J. 1424, 1426, 1428 (1976).

